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Abstract 
 
In this article, I examine some of the theoretical and practical implications of understanding 
durable solutions as potential forms of reparation that can be offered to refugees for the 
unjust harms of displacement. I begin by making a basic moral case that durable solutions can 
act as forms of reparation, exploring the ways in which the creation or restoration of effective 
citizenship in a state through one of the durable solutions can go some way to providing 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction for refugees. I then discuss some considerations 
which need to be taken into account when seeking to identify which state should offer which 
durable solution as reparation to which refugees in any given case, such as the UHIXJHHV¶
choice, their place of residence and social ties, any sense of group identity, and questions of 
state capacity and efficiency. Observing that bestowing a reparative function upon durable 
solutions would potentially create a tension with their classical humanitarian rationale, I 
move to explore how this tension might be navigated, with particular reference to the 
question of how states with limited resources should prioritise the needs of refugees for 
whose flight they are morally responsible vis-à-vis refugees for whose flight they are not 
responsible. 
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Introduction 
 
The three durable solutions ± of voluntary repatriation, local integration and third-country 
resettlement ± have come to be a central element of refugee protection over the course of the 
last six decades. Within the United Nations, both durable solutions and refugee protection 
more broadly have been given a classically humanitarian rationale, with the intention that 
these solutions will be pursued in a politically neutral manner, independently of politically 
contentious questions such as who bears respRQVLELOLW\IRUFDXVLQJUHIXJHHV¶ flight (Landgren, 
1998: 420).1 Indeed, the Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) states that LWVZRUNLQµVHHNLQJSHUPDQHQWVROXWLRQVIRUWKHSUREOHPRIUHIXJHHV¶LV
WREHRIDµKXPDQLWDULDQDQGVRFLDO¶DQGµHQWLUHO\QRQ-poliWLFDOFKDUDFWHU¶(UNHCR, 1950: 6).  
,Q SUDFWLFH RI FRXUVH 81+&5¶V ZRUN has been inescapably political (Loescher, 
2001: 2), and durable solutions have been put to the service of numerous other political, 
economic and strategic goals, some of which are incompatible with their humanitarian 
rationale (see Chimni 2004). The pursuit of these solutions can also be justified in terms of 
their contribution to regional security and peace-building (Milner 2009), and by reference to 
their close relationship with transitional justice measures (Duthie 2012). Nevertheless, the 
principle of humanitarianism has underpinned understandings of durable solutions throughout 
the history of their pursuit.  
This humanitarian rationale for durable solutions is rooted in an important moral 
FRQFHUQIRUUHIXJHHV¶ZHOO-being. Yet, as I shall argue in this article, there is another equally 
morally compelling way of understanding and pursuing durable solutions: as forms of 
reparation for the unjust harms of displacement. That is, durable solutions may potentially 
constitute a means through which states can discharge their special obligations towards 
refugees for whose flight they are morally responsible.2 Durable solutions are, on this 
account, capable of achieving for refugees the same end which reparations programmes seek: 
                                                          
1
 This classical humanitarianism, as exemplified by the apolitical aspirations of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross ,&5&VWDQGVLQFRQWUDVWZLWKDPRUHSROLWLFDOO\HQJDJHGµVROLGDULVW¶EUDQGRIKXPDQLWDULDQLVP
which is willing to condemn rights violators (see Weiss 1999). Unless otherwise stated, I henceforth use the 
WHUPµKXPDQLWDULDQLVP¶WRUHIHUWRLts classical form. 
2
 I understand the notion of moral responsibility to refer specifically to cases in which agents deserve moral 
blame for their actions (Miller 2007: 89). For the sake of brevity, unless otherwise stated I subsequently use the 
term µresponsibility¶ to refer to this narrower form of moral responsibility. 
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the rectification of past injustice, through restitution, compensation and satisfaction.3 In 
making this argument, I do not advocate the abandonment of durable solutiRQV¶KXPDQLWDULDQ
rationale in favour of this reparative approach, but highlight the significant moral merits of 
such an approach.   
Although the basic notion of durable solutions as potential forms of reparation is 
highly intuitive, or so I shall argue, it has until recently been largely overlooked by both 
practitioners in this field and by scholars within refugee and forced migration studies. While 
links between durable solutions and accountability for displacement have been identified by 
the Inter-AgHQF\6WDQGLQJ&RPPLWWHH¶V)UDPHZRUNIRU,QWHUQDOO\'LVSODFHG3HUVRQV,'3V
(IASC 2010)  and the United Nations 6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶V)UDPHZRUNRQ'XUDEOe Solutions 
(UNSG 2011), recent work has demonstrated the ways in which reparations and transitional 
justice mechanisms can contribute to the attainment of durable solutions (Duthie 2012). Some 
scholars have examined, in varying degrees of depth, the ways in which particular durable 
solutions, such as voluntary repatriation (Bradley 2013) and asylum and resettlement (Walzer 
1983), may act reparatively. The intended innovation of this article is to extend these insights 
by exploring the implications of understanding the durable solutions framework as a whole in 
terms of reparation.4  
Recognition of durable solutions¶UHSDUDWLYHSRWHQWLDO matters for at least four reasons, 
which straddle the scholarly and the practical. Firstly, such recognition is important as part of 
an overall effort to identify the full range of moral obligations that states bear towards 
refugees, including those which have hitherto been neglected, which can both enhance 
academic understandings of the ethics of refugee protection and motivate practical efforts to 
hold states to those obligations. Reparation, it is increasingly recognised, is owed to refugees 
as a matter of justice, but is still relatively seldom offered to them explicitly. If durable 
solutions are ± as I argue they are ± a fitting and even obvious means of offering this much-
                                                          
3
 %\ WDNLQJ WKLV PRUDO IRFXV RQ UHSDUDWLRQ IRU XQMXVW KDUPV , OHDYH DVLGH WKH TXHVWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU D VWDWH¶V
obligation to offer a durable solution as reparation could be grounded in international law, and view the unjust 
harms which result from displacement as encompassing, but not necessarily being limited to, human rights 
violations as they are legally defined. 
4
 To my knowledge, this reparative approach to the durable solutions framework has been discussed only in 
passing. Rhodri C. Williams (  KDV UHFRJQLVHG WKDW µthe corrective justice aspirations of reparations 
programs ± to provide redress in proportion to the harm suffered by victims ± would imply that they share many 
of the same basic oEMHFWLYHVDVGXUDEOHVROXWLRQV¶ZKLOH81+&5KDVDVVHUWHGLQUHODWLRQWR,'3V
WKDWµ>I@URPDSURWHFWLRQSHUVSHFWLYHILQGLQJODVWLQJVROXWLRQVWKDWEULQJDQHQGWRLQWHUQDOGLVSODFHPHQWLVDQ
important form of reparation for the violations sufIHUHGE\,'3V¶,QWKLVDUWLFOH,GHYHORSWKLV line of argument 
and extend it to refugees more broadly. My discussion does not hinge on any particular definition of the refugee, 
whether that of the 1951 Refugee Convention or a broader conception. 
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needed reparation to refugees, then states are duty-bound to offer them. Given that the 
principle of reparation is, in common moral thought, equally if not more compelling than the 
principle of humanitarianism, it seems somewhat arbitrary to limit our attention to the 
humanitarian potential of durable solutions, while at the same time ignoring their latent 
reparative capacities.   
Secondly, despite its rooting in compelling moral principle, a decision to use durable 
solutions reparatively would have significant implications for the operation of the refugee 
regime. It would not only involve a departure from the apolitical aspirations of durable 
solutions as they have been traditionally conceived, and necessitate a far greater engagement 
with controversial questions of responsibility for forced migration. It would, as I shall argue 
later, also upset the now orthodox hierarchy of durable solutions, which views voluntary 
UHSDWULDWLRQ DV µthe GXUDEOH VROXWLRQ¶ &KLPQL   E\ recasting the provision of all 
three durable solutions as potentially being matters of justice.  
Thirdly, the notion has the potential to strengthen advocacy calls for the redoubling of 
efforts to achieve durable solutions. It is widely believed that the principle of reparation, as a 
special and negative obligation, is weightier than that of humanitarianism, which is general 
and positive (see Pogge 2002: 139). There is, then, a pragmatic case for framing durable 
solutions reparatively that is of strong interest to activists given that, as a matter of moral 
psychology, this approach may well exert a greater influence on policy-makers and publics 
(see Butt 2009: 16). Lastly, because a durable solution involves, as I shall discuss, the 
creation or restoration of citizenship, this discussion has theoretical implications not only for 
our understanding of durable solutions, but also for our understanding of the potential moral 
functions of citizenship itself. 
I begin by making a basic moral case that durable solutions can act reparatively, 
exploring the ways in which the creation or restoration of effective citizenship in a state 
through one of the durable solutions can go some way to providing restitution, compensation 
and satisfaction for refugees. I then discuss some considerations which need to be taken into 
account when seeking to identify which state should offer which durable solution as 
reparation to which refugees in any given case VXFKDV WKHUHIXJHHV¶FKRLce, their place of 
residence and social ties, any sense of group identity, and questions of state capacity and 
efficiency. Observing that bestowing a reparative function upon durable solutions would 
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potentially create a tension with their humanitarian rationale, I move to explore how this 
tension might be navigated, with particular reference to the question of how resource-
constrained states should prioritise refugees for whose flight they are responsible vis-à-vis 
refugees for whose flight they are not responsible. 
 
The Case for Viewing Durable Solutions Reparatively  
 
A basic moral case for understanding durable solutions reparatively can be made in 
several relatively simple and intuitive steps, which are nevertheless worth outlining in order 
to lay out the logic behind this approach. The first step is to acknowledge that many of the 
unjust harms that refugees experience before, during and following their flight ± whether 
through the loss of their safety, security, homes, livelihoods or relationships ± flow from their 
lack of effective citizenship within a state (Arendt, 1986 [1948]: 293; Shacknove 1985). This 
effective citizenship is, at root, membership in DVWDWHZKLFKVHUYHVDVD µSUHFXUVRU¶ IRU WKH
enjoyment of basic human rights (Batchelor 1998: 156), and which effectively responds to 
the security concerns and material needs that are often the most tenacious obstacles to durable 
solutions.5 Refugees lose or continue to lack this effective citizenship when their states of 
origin actively violate their basic rights, or fail to protect them from serious harm either 
perpetrated by external states or non-state actors, or which is the result of severe deprivation. 
Effective citizenship operates as a bulwark against such abuse, harm and deprivation.  
The second step in this argument is to note that one important means of offering 
reparation to refugees for the unjust harms of displacement is to offer such effective 
citizenship, either in refugees¶VWDWHVRIRULJLQRULQother states. This can involve either the 
restoration of effective citizenship, if refugees enjoyed such citizenship before they fled, or 
the creation of it for the first time if, as is often the case, the refugees in question have never 
enjoyed it (see Long 2008: 35-36). Such citizenship may, but not necessarily, be offered 
formally and entail naturalisation.6 If, at bottom, the principle of reparation is the notion that 
                                                          
5
 I use tKHWHUPµHIIHFWLYH¶LQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUHIXJHHVDQGde jure stateless persons for, 
while refugees may retain citizenship formally, they are deprived of the basic rights which should flow from this 
citizenship (see Batchelor 1998: 172). 
6
 Indeed, it is important to recognise that refugees may find de facto protection or informal modes of citizenship 
or belonging beneath the radar of the state in which they reside, and are very often agents of their own durable 
solution (see Zetter and Long 2012). Furthermore, non-state actors, such as international organisations, may also 
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HYHU\µIDXOWFUHDWHVWKHREOLJDWLRQWRPDNHJRRGWKHORVV¶*URWLXVTXRWHGLQ/HH, 
then an offer of effective citizenship to refugees can clearly fulfil exactly this function. Given 
that reparations, as opposed to remedies, can be offered only by those morally responsible for 
a harm, and not by third parties (see Thompson 2002: 42), an offer of effective citizenship by 
a state to a refugee can only constitute a genuine offer of reparation if the state making the 
offer bears at least some degree of moral responsibility for the harms experienced by the 
refugee as a result of his or her flight.7  
The third point is that the aim of durable solutions is precisely to create or restore this 
effectiYH FLWL]HQVKLS ZKHWKHU LQ UHIXJHHV¶ states of origin (in the case of voluntary 
repatriation), in their states of first asylum (in the case of local integration), or in third states 
(in the case of resettlement). As /RQJ   KDV REVHUYHG µ>D@OO WKUHH ³GXUDEOH
VROXWLRQV´«DUHLQWHQGHGWRUHVWRUHDUHIXJHH¶VDFFHVVWRFLWL]HQVKLSDQGWKURXJKFLWL]HQVKLS
the protHFWLRQ DQG H[SUHVVLRQ RI WKHLU IXQGDPHQWDO KXPDQ ULJKWV¶ such that voluntary 
repatriation may function as a renewal of the social contract between a refugee and his or her 
state of origin (Long 2008). Durable solutions, therefore, implicitly view the fundamental 
µSUREOHP¶IDFLQJUHIXJHHVWREHWKHLUODFNRIHIIHFWLYHFLWL]HQVKLSDQGWKHµVROXWLRQ¶WREHLWV
lasting establishment (Gottwald 2012: 104). Given that an offer of effective citizenship can, if 
undertaken E\ D VWDWH EHDULQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU UHIXJHHV¶ IOLght, constitute a form of 
reparation for those refugees, and durable solutions aim to provide such citizenship, durable 
solutions may, therefore, themselves act as forms of reparation. 
 
Restitution, Compensation and Satisfaction 
Another means of demonstrating the reparative capacity of durable solutions is to 
outline how each of these three solutions fits within the standard international reparations 
framework. Reparations are commonly thought to fall into at least three categories: 
restitution (the attempt to restore the conditions before a violation occurred); compensation (a 
monetary or material transfer); and satisfaction (such as apologies, trials and truth-telling 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
play an important role in addressing the harms of displacement. However, in a world carved into sovereign 
states which remain the ultimate guarantors of rights, a key means of rectifying the harms of displacement 
remains formal citizenship in a state. 
7
 Throughout this article, I use reparation and redress synonymously.  
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exercises) (UN General Assembly [UNGA] 2005; International Law Commission 2001: 52).8 
How might durable solutions offer each of these forms of reparation?  
Firstly, voluntary repatriation can clearly act as a form of restitution if, through their 
flight, refugees lost effective citizenship which is later restored upon their return.9 The greater 
the ability of voluntary repatriation to restore the status quo ante, by allowing refugees to 
regain their particular homes, properties and assets, and resume their lives prior to their 
displacement, the stronger a form of restitution it is. Voluntary repatriation ± if conceived as 
the renewal of the relationship between a state and citizen which does not necessarily entail 
SK\VLFDOUHWXUQWRWKDWVWDWH¶VWHUULWRU\/RQJ: 369) ± may also provide restitution, even 
if the refugee decides not to return but rather to continue residing elsewhere. In such a 
scenario, a refugee would regain effective citizenship in his or her state of origin, but would 
choose not to avail themselves of the right to residence in that state that forms part of such 
citizenship. 
Restitution through voluntary repatriation has been assumed to be the optimal form of 
redress for the harms of displacement in documents such as the Pinheiro Principles on 
Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (see Bradley 2013: 83) 
and within return policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina following its conflict in the 1990s (Williams 
2012: 92). Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate either the capacity of voluntary 
repatriation to provide restitution, or the moral desirability of using this solution to achieve 
restitution for refugees. Some of the harms of displacement are so egregious as to be 
practically irreparable; if the status quo ante was itself unjust, then it should not be restored 
in any case; and restitution should not create fresh injustices by displacing secondary 
occupants who may have developed genuine property rights over the course of their extended 
residence (Bradley 2013: 188-189). It also may not even be desired by refugees, many of 
whom will have rebuilt their lives elsewhere by the time voluntary repatriation is even viable, 
and who may not have the static conception of home that many might imagine them to have 
(see Warner 1994).  
Despite these limitations, it might still be thought that only voluntary repatriation is 
genuinely capable of providing any measure of restitution to refugees. As Long (2012: 369) 
                                                          
8
 The UN Reparations Guidelines also lists rehabilitation (in the form of medical, psychological, legal and social 
care and assistance) and guarantees of non-repetition as forms of reparation (UNGA 2005). 
9
 Indeed, the 815HSDUDWLRQV*XLGHOLQHVYLHZVERWKµFLWL]HQVKLS¶DQGµUHWXUQWRRQH¶VSODFHRIUHVLGHQFH¶WREH
potential forms of restitution (UNGA 2005). 
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has commented, µthe righting of the wrong of involuntary flight can arguably only be 
achieved through return, rather than resetWOHPHQW¶. This is indeed arguable, for the other two 
durable solutions are able to offer a meaningful degree of restitution in a broader sense: both 
ORFDO LQWHJUDWLRQ DQG UHVHWWOHPHQW DUH FDSDEOH RI UHVWRULQJ UHIXJHHV¶ HIfective citizenship, 
even if this effective citizenship is to be enjoyed in a different state from the one in which 
they once enjoyed it. 
In addition to offering restitution, the three durable solutions can also act as 
meaningful forms of compensation. Effective citizenship often entails access to a bundle of 
goods, including welfare provisions, which are of course particularly substantial within the 
global North. Having admitted a refugee into the fold of its political community, a state 
bearing responsibility for his or her flight is also in a better position to also offer further 
forms of compensation to that refugee, such as family reunification, or specialist 
psychological support.  
If a durable solution is openly and fully acknowledged by the state offering it as a 
form of reparation and is understood by the refugees in question as such, then a durable 
solution may also act as a form of satisfaction: a means of communicating its recognition of 
its own wrongdoing and its symbolic commitment not to repeat the actions which led those 
refugees to flee. Price (2009) has explored the ways in which asylum, which he understands a 
permanent status akin to local integration, has a strong expressive function. While Price 
focuses on the ability of asyluP WR FRQYH\ D VWDWH¶V FRQGHPQDWLRQ RI WKH DFWLRQV RI RWKHU
states, there is no reason in principle why an offer of asylum, or the other durable solutions, 
cannot also embody a sense of contrition and apology, which can be strengthened in 
conjunction with other initiatives aimed at achieving satisfaction for refugees, such as trials 
or truth-telling exercises (see Bradley 2012a).  
I hope now to have demonstrated that the offer of effective citizenship through a 
durable solution is capable of acting reparatively, either as a form of restitution, 
compensation or satisfaction. However, it is important not to exaggerate GXUDEOH VROXWLRQV¶
reparative potential, strong as it is, for they are best understood as having a potentially strong 
reparative element, rather than being fully reparative by themselves. The establishment of 
effective citizenship is an important, yet insufficient form of reparation by itself, given that 
refugees may have suffered losses and harms which are not necessarily addressed by durable 
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solutions, such as the separation of families or the psychological impact of displacement. In 
short, states may often have to go beyond durable solutions in order to redress the unjust 
harms of displacement fully, utilising other remedies for human rights violations such as 
trials or truth commissions. To suggest otherwise would be to risk allowing states to shirk 
their additional reparative responsibilities to refugees once they have offered them a durable 
solution. However, it is often the case that the provision of durable solutions can facilitate 
and promote access to these additional forms of reparations so that, taken together, durable 
solutions and these other mechanisms repair the harms of displacement to the greatest extent 
possible. For instance, by allowing for voluntary repatriation, refugees may more easily 
participate in truth-telling exercises or access compensation in their states of origin, which 
have often been inaccessible to those remaining in exile (Bradley 2012a: 207). 
It is also important to note that the extent RI GXUDEOH VROXWLRQV¶ UHSDUDWLYH FDSDFLW\
depends on the ways in which these solutions are both conceived and pursued. While it is true 
that, in theory, the aim of durable solutions is to create or restore effective citizenship, it 
could be argued that this reparative potential is stymied by several key practical limitations. 
Firstly, it might be said, the top-down and somewhat paternalistic manner in which durable 
solutions have been pursued by UNHCR and states in the past ± given their privileging of 
state interests through tripartite commissions composed of UNHCR, the state of asylum and 
the state of RULJLQZKLFKKDYHV\VWHPDWLFDOO\LJQRUHGUHIXJHHV¶YRLFHVDQGLQWHUHVWVDQGKDYH
pushed for repatriation even while the situations which caused refugees to flee persisted (e.g. 
Crisp 1984; Harrell-Bond 1989) ± would preclude their meaningful use as forms of 
reparation. Secondly, the fact that durable solutions have possesVHG LQ 2OLYHU %DNHZHOO¶V
ZRUGV D VWURQJ µVHGHQWDU\ ELDV¶ (Bakewell 2008 quoted in Long 2010: 5), which sees the 
provision of a solution as entailing the cessation of all further movement and migration, also 
limits their reparative potential.  
In response to these concerns, it can be argued that it is not the pursuit of policies 
which aim to achieve durable solutions per se that may act reparatively, but durable solutions 
when conceived and implemented in the most morally justifiable way. This means that, for 
durable solutions to operate reparatively, or for efforts to repatriate refugees even to 
constitute a durable solution in the first place, they must be pursued and realised in ways 
ZKLFK UHVSHFW UHIXJHHV¶ choice, and provides opportunities for their continued mobility. I 
shall return to this principle of refugee choice later in this article.   
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One important implication of understanding durable solutions reparatively is that this 
approach weakens the traditional hierarchy of durable solutions. Coupled with the privileging 
of restitution over other forms of reparation, voluntary repatriation is widely seen by states, 
and has been judged by UNHCR, to be the preferred durable solution, whereas resettlement, 
and arguably also local integration, are seen as being merely discretionary (UNHCR 2011: 
36). Yet if, as I am arguing, states are duty-bound to offer the most fitting form of reparation 
to refugees for whose flight they are responsible, and resettlement or local integration is most 
fitting, then an offer of one of these two solutions is not discretionary but rather obligatory, 
and a matter of justice. While scholars have rejected this hierarchy of solutions on other 
grounds (e.g. see Adelman and Barkan 2011), understanding durable solutions reparatively 
therefore provides further support for DVKLIW WR WKHPRUHKROLVWLFQRWLRQRI µFRPSUHKHQVLYH
VROXWLRQV¶*RWWZDOG 
 
Which States Owe Which Durable Solutions as Reparation to Refugees? 
I now hope to have made a basic and intuitive moral case IRU GXUDEOH VROXWLRQV¶
reparative potential. However, an important implication of this approach remains to be 
explored: the question of which states should offer which durable solution to which refugees. 
While the particular answer to this question will of course vary from case to case, in this 
section I seek to identify some broad criteria which can provide guidance in any given 
situation. 
The first and most obvious consideration is the question of which state is responsible 
for the flight of any given refugees. As I commented earlier, reparation can only be offered 
by the actors who bear responsibility for unjust harm. There is, however, one general answer 
to this question which, in its simple form, needs to be set aside at the outset. This is what has 
EHHQGXEEHGWKHµLQWHUQDOLVW¶DSSURDFKWRIRUFHGPLgration (see Chimni 1998: 360; Zolberg et 
al. YLZKLFKYLHZVUHIXJHHV¶VWDWHVRIRULJLQDVEHDULng full, or at least predominant, 
responsibility for the generation of refugees. 5HIXJHHV¶VWDWHVRIRULJLQEHDUDVWURQJUHPHGLDO
responsibility towards them on account of the bond of citizenship between the two parties, 
and have an obligation to create the conditions which allow for their voluntary repatriation, 
which persists even if those refugees gain protection or citizenship elsewhere (Bradley 2013: 
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32-33).10 +RZHYHUUHIXJHHV¶VWDWHVRIRULJLQGRQRWQHFHVVDULO\EHDUPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRU
their flight. The clearly external causes of forced migration, which often interact with internal 
factors, range from military interventions to the workings of the international political 
economy (see e.g. Gibney 2004: 48-57).  
Having recognised the fact that responsibility for forced migration lies with both 
UHIXJHHV¶VWDWHVRIRULJLQDQGZLWKH[WHUQDOVWDWHVLWPLJKWEHWHPSWLQJWRVHHNWRPDWFKWKH
state which bears responsibility IRUDUHIXJHHV¶IOLJKWZLWKDSDUWLFXODUGXUDEle solution. The 
seemingly obvious way of undertaking such matching woulGEHWRFODLPWKDWLILWLVUHIXJHHV¶
state of origin which is primarily responsible for their flight, then voluntary repatriation is 
most reparatively fittingLIWKHUHIXJHHV¶VWDWHRIDV\OXPLVSULPDULO\UHVSRQVLEOHWKHQDV\OXP
followed by local integration is most fitting; and if a resettlement state is primarily 
responsible, then resettlement is most fitting.  
There may indeed be cases in which this kind of matching exercise is justifiable. 
Equally, however, there are other cases in which other considerations can cause us to depart 
from this somewhat simplistic procedure. The question of which state bears responsibility for 
the flight of refugees is only one, albeit central, consideration for determining which durable 
solution should be offered reparatively. Even if this form of matching does turn out to be 
justifiable, this will only be because the other considerations which should be taken into 
account also point to that conclusion. What, then, are these other considerations? 
The first additional consideration is the principle of refugee choice that I mentioned 
earlier. If an important aim of reparation is the restoration of full dignity and agency ± 
understood as the renewed ability to make claims (see Bradley 2013: 60) ± then, as Duthie 
(2012: 54) has puts LW µDQ LPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRI UHGUHVV LV WKHDELOLW\ WRFKRRVHD VROXWLRQ LQ
LWVHOI¶ 7KLV FKRLFH VKRXOd be as wide as possible, allowing refugees to decide between 
durable solutions and, ideally, allowing them to switch between such solutions (such that 
choosing, for instance, to locally integrate should not preclude a later decision to return to 
RQH¶V RULginal home).11 This principle of choice also undermines the hierarchy of durable 
solutions which I criticised above. While there is evidence that some displaced persons, such 
DV ,'3V LQ 8JDQGD ZRXOG ZHOFRPH µJRYHUQPHQW DVVLVWDQFH LQ UHWXUQ«DV D IRUP RI
                                                          
10
 For the distinction between moral and remedial forms of responsibility, see Miller (2007: ch. 4). 
11
 This ability to switch between solutions is emphasised by the IASC (2010: 12) in its Framework on Durable 
Solutions for IDPs. 
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repDUDWLRQV¶ 5HIXJee Law Project 2009: 13), others ± such as Colombian refugees 
interviewed by Cantor (2011: 32) ± would not, and have strongly preferred to seek stability in 
their host countries. 
It could be objected here that this principle of choice is not an µLQH[WULFDEOHSDUWRIWKH
LGHD RI UHIXJHH SURWHFWLRQ¶ *LEQH\  , and that states are therefore not obliged to 
RIIHUUHIXJHHV¶SUHIHUUHGGXUDEOHVROXWLRQVWRWKHP. However, where reparation is concerned, 
UHIXJHHV¶FKRLFHPXVWEHJLYHQFRQsiderable weight. While it is highly desirable that every 
refugee be given as wide a palette of options concerning their protection as possible, it can be 
argued that, when reparation is being offered, the principle of refugee choice is especially 
strong. Bearing in mind that, as I suggested above, an important goal of reparation is to 
restore dignity and agency, a durable solution will fail to achieve this end, and will therefore 
not constitute a genuine form of reparation at all, if it is offered to, or even imposed on, a 
refugee against his or her will. 
The second, and related, consideration is the place of residence and social ties of the 
refugees in question. While UNHCR (2011: 35) has rightly recognised that local integration 
is often the most appropriDWHGXUDEOHVROXWLRQ IRU WKRVHZKRDOUHDG\KDYHGHYHORSHG µFORVH
IDPLO\ VRFLDO FXOWXUDO DQG HFRQRPLF OLQNV WR WKHLU FRXQWU\ RI DV\OXP¶ WKHRULVWV VXFK DV
Joseph Carens (2009) have powerfully argued that depriving non-citizens of a right to stay 
after a number of years often cruelly deprives them of social ties which provide their lives 
with meaning.12 For instance, the most reparatively fitting durable solution for an Iraqi 
asylum seeker who has strong social ties as a result of his or her residence in the United 
Kingdom (UK) for several years may very well be British citizenship, given these ties and the 
8.¶VSDUWLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKHJHQHUDWLRQRI,UDTL UHIXJHHVVLQFH WKH LQYDVLRQRI ,UDT LQ
2003. 
  
A third additional consideration is whether the refugees in question are bound by a 
strong sense of group identity, which may generate a desire among them to reside together in 
a community or to take the pursuit of a particular durable solution as the basis of a shared 
political project. This may manifest itself as a desire to live in a state which already contains 
a strong diaspora community for that group, or it might instead manifest itself as a strong 
                                                          
12
 This consideration is FRQQHFWHG WR WKH QRWLRQ ZLWKLQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ RI D µJHQXLQH DQG HIIHFWLYH OLQN¶
between an individual and a state, which has been used as a ground for naturalisation (see Batchelor 1998). 
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determination to achieve political rights in a homeland through voluntary repatriation, which 
has been evident in the cases of Palestinian refugees and the Guatemalan return movement of 
the 1990s (see Bradley 2013: ch. 4; ch. 8). In such cases, the durable solution offered may 
function as a collective, rather than solely being an individual, juridical form of reparation.13 
Whereas local integration or resettlement may be fitting for individual refugees, voluntary 
repatriation may be XQLTXHO\DEOHWRµRIIHUWKHSROLWLFDOVSDFHWRDGGUHVVJURXS-based as well 
aVLQGLYLGXDOSROLWLFDOULJKWV¶ (Long 2012: 373; see also Kymlicka 1995: 98-99).  
 
The fourth additional consideration concerns state capacity; that is, whether states are 
able to meet their reparative obligations to refugees while also fulfilling their obligations 
towards their own citizens. In the case of fragile states throughout the developing world, this 
of course simply cannot be counted on. In situations of extreme material scarcity, meeting the 
PLQLPDOQHHGVRIRQH¶VFLWL]HQVPD\WUXPSWKHREOLJDWLRQWRRIIHUUHSDUDWLRQ to refugees for, 
as Lu (2007: 203-KDVDUJXHG µQRWKLQJPD\ MXVWLI\D OHYHORIPDWHULDO UHSDUDWLRQV WKDW
ZRXOG LQFDSDFLWDWH D VWDWH IURP IXOILOOLQJ LWV GRPHVWLF REOLJDWLRQV¶ ,QGHHG WKHUH DUH RWKHU
actors besides refugees, such as host and return communities, who also have strong reparative 
claims in situations in which efforts are being made to resolve displacement, such as times of 
political transition and attempts at reconciliation. It is also increasingly recognised that, in 
states devastated by war or social conflict, sustainable voluntary repatriation is initially an 
aspiration, and is D µGLIILFXOW JUDGXDO ORQJ-term process that requires significant capacity-
EXLOGLQJE\WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶81+&5 
 
At times, furthermore, considerations of efficiency may have a bearing upon the kind 
of durable solution which is most reparatively fitting LI D VWDWH¶V UHVRXUFHV DQG DEVRUSWLYH
capacity are genuinely such that it can only offer one type of durable solution to large 
numbers of refugees to whom it owes one, then it may be justified in offering one rather than 
the other. This may potentially be the case with regard to resettlement, which has been 
criticised as an expensive and even lavish measure (see Milner 2005: 523). It is conceivable 
that a poor state wKLFKERUHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUVRPHUHIXJHHV¶IOLJKWPD\ genuinely only have 
the capacity to offer one standard durable solution to a large group of refugees after granting 
them prima facie refugee status following a mass influx, and may have to dispense with a 
                                                          
13
 For analysis of collective reparations, see de Greiff (2006) and van der Auwereart (2012). 
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resource-intensive programme of individual, juridical reparations and individualised refugee 
status determination (see de Greiff 2006).  
 
These considerations mean that we cannot necessarily conclude that the kind of 
matching exercise mentioned earlier will be justified. Refugees may not desire the durable 
solution that this exercise may recommend, perhaps given their place of residence and social 
ties, or the state may genuinely not have the capacity to offer it.14  However, if a durable 
solution is to function reparatively then, as we have seen, it must be offered by the agent 
responsible for the unjust harms of displacement. It might seem that the principle of refugee 
choice undermines this principle of reparation for, surely, it might be argued, it must be the 
state that caused the reIXJHHV¶IOLJKW that bears the obligation to offer them a durable solution 
on its territory. How might a stDWH EHDULQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU UHIXJHHV¶ IOLJKW RIIHU WKHP
reparation if they prefer a durable solution in another state?  
 
The first option is that of inter-state compensation. If, all things considered, the most 
fitting durable solution for some refugees is one that cannot be directly offered by the state 
responsible on its territory, then that state may offer reparation more indirectly. If, say, 
voluntary repatriation is not desired by certain refugees, then reparation may still potentially 
be offered to them by their states of origin, conceivably through the provision of 
compensatioQ WR WKH UHIXJHHV¶ states of asylum (see Garry 1998; Lee 1986). While this 
arrangement might seem to shift WKH IRFXV DZD\ IURP UHIXJHHV¶ DJHQF\ WR WKH VHWWOLQJ RI
scores between states, it potentially allows for greater flexibility for refugees. Although the 
logic of reparation entails that it be offered by the actor responsible, this option constitutes a 
means of avoiding the trapping of refugees in the responsible VWDWH¶V WHUULWRU\, by allowing 
them to choose their preferred durable solution. If managed properly, such an arrangement 
could WKHUHIRUHHQKDQFHUDWKHUWKDQXQGHUPLQHUHIXJHHV¶DJHQF\ 
 
The second way in which a durable solution may operate reparatively, even if it is 
offered on the territory of a state which does not bear responsibility for refugees¶ flight, is for 
                                                          
14
 These criteria for distributing reparative responsibilities to offer durable solutions broadly match some of 
those presented by Miller in his connection theory of remedial responsibility, which aims to specify the 
connections between an agent and a bad situation which can ground responsibilities to remedy it. In addition to 
the notions of causal and moral responsibility which are most relevant to the principle of reparation, Miller sees 
communitarian connection and capacity as two additional grounds for distributing remedial responsibilities 
(2007: 103-105).  
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the responsible state to help to create the conditions which allow for the attainment of that 
durable solution. In the case of voluntary repatriation, for instance, this may involve an 
external state offering assistance with reconstruction or development WR UHIXJHHV¶ states of 
origin. Furthermore, given that reparations and other transitional justice measures can 
contribute to the conditions that allow for voluntary repatriation or other durable solutions 
(see Duthie 2012), then the external states responsible for refuJHHV¶IOLJKWPD\EHDUDIXUWKHU
responsibility to offer and facilitate reparations SURJUDPPHVLQUHIXJHHV¶VWDWHVRIorigin, such 
as property restitution, the criminal prosecution of perpetrators, truth-telling exercises or 
compensation. In short, specific reparations may have to be offered within a state of origin 
for voluntary repatriation to operate reparatively in itself. Such reparations and voluntary 
repatriation may be mutually reinforcing, for the reconciliation, however minimal, which may 
result from reparations allows for voluntary repatriation to be more sustainable, while 
voluntary repatriation may increase access to, and participation in, other reparations efforts in 
UHIXJHHV¶ VWDWHV RI origin. Development assistance and efforts aimed at achieving some 
degree of reconciliation between refugees and their host societies which allow for sustainable 
local integration to be achieved (see Bradley 2012a: 12) may also play a reparative role.  
 
 
Further Implications  
 
I have already observed how a reparative conception of durable solutions has a range 
of implications both for our theoretical understanding of durable solutions and citizenship, 
and also for the operation of the refugee regime. For instance, this approach begs questions of 
institutionalisation and enforcement, such as the issue of which international body would 
allocate responsibilities to offer durable solutions in practice. Moreover, although the offer of 
a durable solution as reparation to refugees tracks state practice to some extent ± for instance, 
the belatedly accelerated resettlement of Iraqi refugees generated by the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
to the US was motivated at least partly by a sense of special obligation towards them (see 
Berman 2012: 126) ± it currently appears somewhat unrealistic to expect states voluntarily to 
accept responsibility for, and offer durable solutions to, large number of refugees in the 
absence of any enforcement mechanism. 
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The implications of shifting from the humanitarian rationale of durable solutions to 
also considering the relevance of a reparative approach remain to be drawn out. Given the 
centrality of the principle of humanitarianism and that of reparation to moral thought, it 
would not do to claim that one should be dispensed with entirely in favour of the other as far 
as durable solutions are concerned ,QVWHDGZHDUH IDFHGZLWK DSRWHQWLDO µFODVKRIQRUPV¶
(Weiner 1998). On the one hand, the reparative approach has the moral advantage of seeking 
to hold states to account for their refugee-producing actions and ideally deterring states from 
engaging in these actions in the first place, rather than giving durable solutions a merely 
µSDOOLDWLYH¶ KXPDQLWDULDQ UROH VHH 3ULFH  . On the other hand, this approach risks, 
when placed in the hands of states, weakening refugee protection. In an international system 
in which responsibilities for refugees are routinely shirked and shifted, attempts to assign 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWRRIIHUGXUDEOHVROXWLRQVFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\GHJHQHUDWHLQWRDµEODPHJDPH¶LQ
which little by way of reparation actually ends up being offered to refugees in need of it, and 
already highly protracted refugee situations are dragged out yet further during the time-
consuming process of negotiating and assigning responsibility.  
 
This approach also raises epistemic problems for, although responsibility could be 
assigned in clear-cut cases, there are other cases in which responsibility may be difficult or 
impossible to identify, in cases of diffuse responsibility such as displacement linked to the 
effects of climate change, or refugee movements associated with systemic forces such as the 
workings of the global political economy (see Souter forthcoming). I have proceeded in this 
article so far as if responsibility for instances of forced migration is invariably borne by one 
state alone, but cases of joint responsibility raise the question of how the responsibility to 
offer durable solutions can be justifiably shared between states, and how a coordinated 
approach to supporting such solutions might be developed. The fact that the pursuit of 
durable solutions is often a complex and gradual process presents the difficulty of 
ascertaining when a durable solution has been achieved, and hence whether a reparative 
obligation has been successfully discharged by a state. 
 
Moreover, if it could be shown that certain cases of displacement were justified 
overall ± in that they were necessary and unavoidable for a morally overriding end such as a 
genuinely humanitarian intervention, and carried out in the most humane manner possible ± 
then it becomes questionable whether a durable solution is invariably owed to refugees as a 
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form of reparation (see Blake 2013: 114-119). If refugees were generated as part of a wholly 
just war, which fully met the criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bellum (see Banta 2008), 
then a durable solution may be owed on humanitarian grounds, but not as reparation. It is for 
this reason that it may be more accurate to speak of reparation as being owed specifically for 
the unjust harms of displacement rather than for any harm, regardless of its overall 
justification. However, it is important not to overstate the likelihood of displacement being 
morally justified and, given its typically extremely heavy human costs, to uphold a strong 
presumption against the legitimacy of displacement and the existence of a prima facie µULJKW
QRWWREHGLVSODFHG¶VHH6WDYURSRXORX which can only been overridden in the face of 
extremely weighty countervailing considerations.  
 
Given lack of space, however, these important implications will have to be deferred 
for future discussion. For the remainder of this article, I briefly focus on the implications of a 
reparative approach to durable solutions for one important question for the ethics of refugee 
protection: how refugees should be prioritised for protection in a climate of scarce resources. 
This is, as we shall see, a particular instance of the tension between the principles of 
humanitarianism and that of reparation in this context. 
 
The Problem of Prioritisation 
 
In order to explore how a reparative approach to durable solutions might affect the 
just prioritisation of refugees, let me briefly outline the abstract characteristics of 
humanitarian duties and reparative obligations. On the one hand, humanitarian duty can be 
broadly characterised as impartial, general, and positive, in that it is a duty to assist 
individuals solely on the basis of the urgency and severity of their need, and regardless of any 
past interaction or relationship with them. Reparative obligations, on the other hand, are 
partialist, special and negative, insofar as they are owed only certain individuals on account 
of past relationships and interactions which arise only as a result of the violation of duties not 
to harm. 
As I mentioned earlier, reparative obligations (and special obligations more broadly) 
are widely believed to be both weightier and more extensive than positive, humanitarian 
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duties (Pogge 2002: 207; Kagan 1988: 293). One clear consequence of this effective 
hierarchy between humanitarian duties and reparative obligations is that, if an agent is 
genuinely unable to fulfil both sets of duties simultaneously for whatever reason, then the 
fulfilment of his or her reparative obligations should take priority. Indeed, as Scheffler (2001: 
86) has contended, part of what it means to have special responsibilities towards particular 
others, whether associates or victims, is µwithin limits, to give their interests priority over the 
interests of non-associates, in cases in whicKWKHWZRFRQIOLFW¶$QDJHQWLVREOLJHGWRSURYLGH
reparation to individuals whom he or she has harmed, even if that means that he or she is 
unable to assist a larger number of needy individuals for whose plight he or she is not 
responsible. 
However, this priority is not absolute or unlimited, but is rather circumscribed by 
RWKHU LPSRUWDQW PRUDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV ,Q 6FKHIIOHU¶V IRUPXODWLRQ FLWHG DERYH VSHFLDO
responsibilities havHSULRULW\RQO\µZLWKLQOLPLWV¶ZKLOH Pogge (2002: 291) REVHUYHVWKDWµ>L@W
is generally acknowledged that a higher moral reason can be outweighed by a lower, if more 
is at stake in the latter¶. Therefore, if an individual whom one has not harmed is in a 
significantly needier state than an individual whom one has harmed, and it is only possible to 
DVVLVWRQHRIWKHPWKHQSULRULWLVLQJRQH¶VKXPDQLWDULDQGXW\RYHURQH¶VUHSDUDWLYHREOLJDWLRQV
may be justifiable. At some point, moreover, the obligation to offer reparation to individuals 
whom one has harmed may be outweighed by the humanitarian duty to assist a greater 
number of needier refugees, if it is impossible to fulfil both simultaneously.    
What are the implications of this abstract discussion for the just prioritisation of 
refugees for durable solutions? The first point is to note that in many cases this issue is purely 
hypothetical, as states are often able simultaneously to fulfil both their humanitarian duties 
and their reparative obligations to refugees by offering them durable solutions. Yet if a state 
were genuinely unable to fulfil both sets of duties, then, on first glance, the principles of 
humanitarianism and of reparation seem to recommend very different courses of action to 
states: humanitarianism says to prioritise the neediest refugees in a process akin to triage (see 
Zolberg et al. 1989: 3), whereas reparation says to prioritise those refugees for whose flight 
one is responsible. This issue could arise either in states of asylum, or conceivably in 
UHIXJHHV¶VWDWHVRIRULJLQ([WHUQDOVWDWHVPLJKWGHHP a refugee to be in more urgent need on 
the basis of the severity of harm that he or she would face on return, or the availability of 
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other forms of protection elsewhere (if, say, a refugee had family members in a neighbouring 
state which could form the basis for a successful application for family reunification there). 
If the hierarchy between humanitarian duty and reparative obligation is accepted, then 
it would seem that genuinely resource-constrained states should prioritise refugees for whose 
flight they are responsible over refugees for whom they bear no such responsibility, at least if 
their need is at a comparable level. This should not be taken to imply that those refugees for 
whose flight those states are not responsible are less deserving of durable solutions, but rather 
that, in times of genuine scarcity, these solutions may have to be offered by other, third-party 
states with greater capability on humanitarian grounds. However, two points can be made 
which complicate this observation. The first is that, although in this kind of scenario states 
would be justified in prioritising their reparative obligations over their humanitarian duties to 
refugees, they also bear a responsibility to develop their resources so that they are able to 
progressively realise both their reparative obligations and their humanitarian duties to offer 
durable solutions and allow for their simultaneous fulfilment.15 
The second point is that, as I observed earlier, the priority of reparative obligations 
over humanitarian duties is circumscribed, and the priority can potentially be reversed by the 
sheer force of other UHIXJHHV¶QHHG,IWKHUHIXJHHVIRUZKRVHIOLJKWDVWDWHLVUHVSRQVLEOHKDYH
a similar level of need to refugees for whose flight that state is not responsible, then priority 
can justifiably be given to the former refugees. However, if the need of the refugees for 
whose flight the state is not responsible is significantly greater, then a strong case can be 
made for prioritising the needier refugees. In such a case, it seems justifiable to prioritise 
saving lives and preventing terrible suffering in the short term, and then seeking to offer 
reparation to the other refugees if and when the state gains the capacity to do so, perhaps by 
providing other benefits to that refugee in her state of asylum. The obligation to offer 
reparation may need, in times of genuine scarcity, to be put on hold to allow the receiving 
state to respond to overridingly pressing and immediate need. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 This borrows the notion of progressive realisation enshrined within Article 2(1) of the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
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Conclusion 
In this article, I have highlighted an emerging approach to durable solutions which, I 
have argued, is highly intuitive and grounded in compelling moral principle. Nevertheless, I 
have sought not to duck the wide range of theoretical and practical implications for refugee 
protection which this approach throws up. I have outlined some broad considerations which I 
believe should be taken into account in any attempt to distribute responsibilities to offer 
durable solutions as reparation to refugees, and have explored a particular potential moral 
tension between the reparative use of durable solutions, and their humanitarian rationale. 
While I have not shown that this tension can be entirely resolved, I suggested some broad 
ways in which it can be navigated, and the obligation to offer reparation and to protect the 
neediest refugees can be balanced. 
As I noted earlier, many more implications of this approach remain to be explored, 
such as questions of how reparative obligations to offer durable solutions would be allocated 
and enforced in practice, especially in cases of diffuse or joint responsibility, and how the 
MXVWLFH RI LQWHUYHQWLRQV ZKLFK FUHDWH UHIXJHHV PLJKW DIIHFW VWDWHV¶ UHSDUDWLYH REOLJDWLRQV WR
offer durable solutions to those refugees. If this reparative understanding of durable solutions 
is to develop beyond being an attractive proposal in principle, if it is to gain traction in 
scholarly and popular debates over refugee protection, and if it is to become a viable mode of 
refugee protection in practice, then further and sustained attention to these implications by 
both scholars and practitioners is required. 
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